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Assessing São Paulo´s Large Drop in Homicides: The 
Role of Demography and Policy Interventions 
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After reaching a historic peak by the end of the 1990s, homicides in 
the São Paulo Metropolitan Area (SMPA) dropped sharply in years 
2000s. In this paper we list the most credible causes and assess 
critically their roles in explaining the large shift in homicides. We 
document several facts: 1) the scope of the movements in homicides is 
not restricted to SPMA, including other large cities in the State of São 
Paulo; 2) several policy changes possibly contributed to the drop in 
homicides in the 2000s in SPMA, but their timing exclude them as an 
explanation for the sure in the 1990s and for the shift in homicides in 
the late 1990s; in addition, 3) their narrow geographical scope exclude 
them as an explanation for the broad geographical movements in 
homicides; 4) economic conditions may have contributed to the 
increase in the 1990s but cannot account for the late 1990s shift; 5) age 
structure had a significant impact on homicides; 6) the time-series 
pattern of homicides in other states is similar to São Paulo´s, providing 
further support for a common-component explanation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The São Paulo Metropolitan Area (SMPA) has received significant attention in 
the domestic and international media for its sharp swings in homicides during the years 
1990s and 2000s.
1 After increasing steadily over the 1990s, homicides fell sharply in the 
2000s. There were 24 homicides per 100thd inhabitants in 2005 at the SPMA, down from 
52 in the 1999 peak, and 20% less than the level in the early 1990s. The dynamics are 
similar to large American cities, where homicides peaked ten years before. Figure 1 
summarizes the motivation for this paper. Although the spotlight was always on the 
SPMA, homicides movements are similar across the board.
2 One can see considerable 





                                                 
1 In the last three years the British weekly newspaper The Economist twice reported twice on the murder 
trends in São Paulo (Protecting citizens from themselves, Oct 20
th 2005 and Not as violent as you thought, 
Aug 21
st 2008) 
2 Specific graphs for all cities with more than 100thd inhabitants are available upon request.   3
This paper assesses the causes behind this large shift in homicides. It is composed 
of 6 sections including this introduction. Section 2 describes the data sources. Section 3 is 
descriptive and provides an overview of the evolution of crime not only in São Paulo but 
in Brazil in general. We show three important facts. First, the homicide phenomenon is a 
peculiarity of the 1990s and 2000s. Homicides were flat or only slightly increasing before 
they surged in the 1990s. Second, crime rates also dropped in other categories, suggesting 
a common component across crime categories.  Finally, homicides follow a similar trend 
in the rest of Brazil, with a three-to-four year lag, again suggesting a common component 
across regions. In section 4, we assess a long list of suspects. Improvements in policing 
occurred. The most important are: 1) the adoption of a unified data and intelligence 
system (INFOCRIM, a version of Compustat); 2) the implementation of a photo database 
of criminals; 3) and the cracking down on illegal firearms possession. Incarcerated 
population also increased over the period. Among municipal-level policy measures, 
several others are worth mentioning: the adoption “dry laws” (which are restrictions on 
the recreational sales of alcohol), the creation of municipal police forces, and the 
adoption of DISQUE-DENÚNCIA (anonymous hotline to report crimes). See Kahn and 
Zanetic [2005].
3 Finally, the state of São Paulo cracked down on illegal gun possession, 
which might have contributed to the reduction in homicides (Goertzel and Kahn (2007)). 
Homicides dropped more sharply in São Paulo than in the rest of the country, 
which suggest that the policies helped to reduce homicides. However, they fail to account 
for the timing of the reversal in the late 1990s because homicides had been dropping for 
at least a couple of years before the first policies were implemented. Consider the “Dry 
laws”. Their adoption is not nearly as broad as the drop in homicides. In addition the 
timing does not match: in all but one city, adoption occurred after 2001. Evidence shows 
that they did cause a non-negligible reduction in homicides, but they are only a 
contributing factor, strengthening a trend that was already in place.
4 Another good 
example is INFOCRIM. The system was first implemented in the city of São Paulo in 
                                                 
3 From 2003, the “Disarmament Act” (Lei do Desarmamento, Lei Nº 10.826) is a federal act that increased 
significantly the penal and civil costs of illegal possession and trade of fire guns. See 
http://www.camara.gov.br/internet/infdoc/Publicacoes/html/pdf/Desarmamento.pdf   
4 By comparing homicide dynamics in adopting and non-adopting municipalities in the SPMA, Biderman et 
al [2009] estimate that “dry laws” caused a reduction of roughly 12% in homicides.    4
2000, then in the rest of the SPMA. Outside the SPMA, implementation started only after 
2005.  
In section 4 we provide evidence on the demographic explanation. In contrast to 
other candidates, demographics rationalize not only the decline in the 1990s, but also the 
surge in homicides in the 1990s. Furthermore, and again in contrast with other 
explanations, demographics explains not only the dynamics of homicide in São Paulo, but 
also in the rest of the country. Homicides peaked in São Paulo in the late 1990s, just as 
the population aged 15-24 also peaked. In the rest of the country, homicides and the 
population aged 15-24 peaked a few years later. 
Section 5 concludes the paper with a brief discussion. The case of São Paulo is 
particularly interesting when compared with the US experience. Zimiring (2007) shows 
that the large shift in crime in late 1980s – early 1990s was not confined to New York 
(the most publicized case), but occurred across the board in the U.S. However, New York 
stands out. The analogy with São Paulo and Brazil is immediate. In the case of São Paulo, 
the increase and drop in homicides is widespread within the state and throughout the 
country. Also in line with the American case, several factors help to explain the decline 
of homicides in the 2000s. However, only demography also rationalizes the decline of 
homicides in the 2000s and the surge in the 1990s. Analogously to New York, the decline 
in São Paulo has been (so far) more pronounced than in the rest of country. Finally, 
Zimiring (2007) analyzes data from Canada and shows a remarkable similarity between 
American and Canadian crime trends, suggesting a common component explanation. In 
Zimiring (2007) own words: 
 
“But what joint causes might have operated in Canada and the United 
States throughout the 1990s? This uncomfortably open question is of 
obvious importance to rethinking the causes of the U.S. decline…What 
would explain the 30% or so of slow and steady decline over the nine 
years following 1991 in the United States and Canada? The only 
traditional theory of decline supported by parallel U.S. and Canadian 
data trends is the decline of high-risk age groups as a percentage of 
the population. But even if all the decline in youth share of population   5
that occurred both in 1980s and 1990s is counted toward the crime 
decline that was confined to the 1990s, it would be difficult to find 
many criminologists who would expect that feature alone to produce a 
crime decline greater than 10%, and even that 10% should have been 
spread more evenly across two decades in both countries. 
[But  the demographic similarity] between Canada and the United 
States over the period 1980 onwards invites, if it does not demand, a 
reconsideration of the magnitude of age structure effects on crime.”
5 
 
We accept Zimiring’s invitation to reconsider the magnitude of age structure 
effects. Using data from São Paulo, we recover a very large elasticity of homicides to 
changes in the size of the 15-to-24 year old population. The criminologists’ difficulty in 
considering the demographic explanation is based on the conventional wisdom that age 
structure effects are small. The similarity between the U.S. and Canada, and our estimates 
for São Paulo, demands a reconsideration of the magnitude of elasticities. 
 
2. Data  
 
We use several sources of data. The city-level homicide data for the state of São 
Paulo come from the Secretaria de Segurança Pública de São Paulo (Secretaria), the 
state-level enforcement authority. Although hospital data is available, we prefer police 
report. Geographical location of hospital murder data is tricky at the city level, since the 
murder victim may be taken to a hospital in another city (is it much less likely that 
victims will cross state lines).  
Data on other crime categories are also from the Secretaria. Crime data in Brazil 
is limited when compared to the US and Canada. Reliable police crime data are not 
available for a long period in Brazil. São Paulo has consistent police report data for some 
categories since 1984, which allows some backward look at the evolution of crime by 
categories. For the rest of the country we use hospital data from DATASUS, which have 
the same consistent categorizations since the mid 1990s. 
                                                 
5 Our emphasis.   6
For states other than São Paulo, no consistent series for crime categories other 
than murder is available. For São Paulo we have data dating back to 1984. Even for São 
Paulo, using data from crime categories other than homicide is a tricky business. As 
Biderman et al (2009) put it “Most crime statistics suffer from serious under-reporting in 
Brazil, stemming from historical lack of confidence in authorities. Under-reporting per se 
does not invalidate the use of other categories, but extra caution must be exercised 
because reporting improved over the sample period. Institutional innovations in the state-
level bureaucracy reduced the costs of reporting. Among them are: i) the creation of 
Poupa-Tempo, whose claque is “time-saver”,  which are offices where all bureaucratic 
errands, including reporting crimes, may be done; ii) Delegacia Eletrônica (electronic 
police station) for on-line reporting; and iii) Delegacias da Mulher, police stations 
specialized in domestic violence.” The “sample period” in Biderman et al (2009) is 
roughly similar to our period of analysis.  
State-level murder data come from DATASUS, the hospital database of the 
National Ministry of Health. Although the data go back quite a long time, the taxonomy 
of violent deaths changed in 1996.
6 Thus, for estimating the state-level panel model we 
use data from 1996 onwards in order to keep consistency of observations across time.
7 
For depicting national aggregates, when inconsistency is less costly, we use data from 
1991. Also from DATASUS are data on the age distribution of homicide victims. 
Demographics are from the Instituto Brasileiro de Estatística e Geografia (IBGE), 
the Brazilian equivalent of the Bureau of Statistics. For census years (1991 and 2000) full 
population counts by age-groups are available. For non-census years in the 1990s, and for 
all years at the city level, population by age-group is projected based on the 1991 and 
2000 census, and the population counts of 1996 and 2007.
8 
Data on the age distribution of perpetrators is from the Secretaria de Justiça do 
Estado de São Paulo, the state-level equivalent of a Department of Justice. Finally, we 
                                                 
6 From 1996 onwards, the system of morbidity taxonomy has been the 10
th International Classification of 
Diseases (ICD-10), which substituted the previous system (the ICD-9). Differences in classification for 
deaths by external causes exist and the Brazilian ICD-9 and 10 series are not compatible with each other. 
More details can be found at the World Health Organization website at 
http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/ 
7 Elasticity estimates are similar if the series is extended back to 1991. 
8 Results are similar if for the 2000s use projections based on the 2000 census and the 2007 population 
count.   7
use two victimization surveys for the city of São Paulo, both conducted by the Instituto 
Futuro Brasil (IFB), a São Paulo-based think-tank. One was conducted in 2003 and 
another in 2008. Results are comparable over time.  
 
3. Taking a wider look: other crimes in São Paulo and Homicides across 
the Country 
 
This section provides a wide overview of crime in São Paulo and the rest of the 
country. A wide view puts the dynamics of homicide in São Paulo into perspective. With 
data dating from before the mid-1990s we may judge whether the 1990s-200s crime shift 
is in fact a peculiarity. Data from other crime categories, and data from other states, allow 
us to assess how widespread the movements in crime are. 
 
3.1 Looking Backwards and at other Categories 
 
We start by showing some long trends of several crime categories in SPMA. Data 
dates back to 1984.
9 Figures 2 through 5 show four categories: homicides, assault, 
common robbery and theft, and vehicle robbery and theft. The important distinction 
between vehicle and common theft (everything but vehicle) is under-reporting. While 
common robberies and thefts are severely under-reported, vehicles are quite well 
measured because of insurance and legal liability reasons (see Biderman et al (2009)).  
 
                                                 
9 Data from before the 1990s is only available for the SPMA.   8
 
 
  The big surge in homicides is mainly a phenomenon from the 1990s. Although 
homicides were picking up since the mid-1980s, neither pace of increase nor the 
consistency is comparable to 1990s. Furthermore, the decline in homicides in the 2000s is 
also an unprecedented phenomenon. 
 
Source: Secretaria de Segurança Pública de São Paulo (SSP-SP)   9
 
Assaults, if anything, follow a pattern symmetrically opposite to homicides. 
However, under-reporting of assaults changed over time. Consider Disque-denúncia, an 
anonymous hot-line to report crime. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Disque-denúncia 
improved reporting of assaults (see Kahn and Zanetic (2005)). Figure 4 shows data from 
the two victimization surveys conducted in city of São Paulo in 2003 and 2008. Panel A 
contains information on the victimization.  In 2003, 4% of respondents declared they had 
been a victim of assault in the previous 18 months. In 2008, the figure drops to 2.7%, a 
33% reduction (the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level).  
Panel B contains information on reporting by victims. In 2003, 29% of victims of assault 
that “called or informed”, and 23% filed a complaint (which implies a police report is 
generated). In 2008, these percentages were 34% and 27.5%, respectively. In summary, 
victimization data suggest that assaults dropped in 2000s, in line with the pattern of 
homicides. For the 1990s, data is inconclusive because of time-varying under-reporting.  





  Figure 5 shows data on thefts and robbery. We present two separate categories: 
vehicle and everything else (common). Vehicle theft and robbery resembles the dynamics 
of homicide. They surge in the 1990s, reach a peak in the around 1999-2000 and then   11
decline monotonically. Common robberies and thefts also surge in 1990s. In contrast to 
vehicles, they do not peak in the late 1990s. In fact, data suggest the stabilized at the high 
late 1990s plateau. Again, however, data is not informative because of improvement in 




  In summary, different well-measured crime categories show that crime in general 
surged in the 1990s and then dropped in 2000s, suggesting a common component 
explanation. 
 
3.3 The Rest of Brazil 
 
Figure 6 shows the evolution of homicide rates in São Paulo vis-à-vis the rest of the 
country.  
 












































Source : DATASUS and Secretaria de Segurança Pública do Estado de São Paulo
Brazil versus São Paulo State in the 1992-2006 period
Fig. 6 Homicides Rates per 100thd inhabitants
 
 
Brazil is São Paulo with a three-to-four-year lag. The increase of homicides 
during the 1990s was remarkably similar in São Paulo and in the rest of Brazil. The two 
series reached a peak in different yet reasonably close moments in time: while homicides 
in São Paulo peaked around 1999, in Brazil the peak was in 2003. From the peak, 
homicides dropped much faster in São Paulo, possibly reflecting a peculiarity in terms of 
policies implemented, or perhaps little time has passed since the peak in the whole 
country.  
Aggregate figures may hide important local heterogeneity that may be 
incompatible with a common component explanation. Figure 7 shows the evolution of 
homicides in several Brazilian states. Although some heterogeneity exists, the co-
movement in homicides is remarkable, reinforcing the idea of a common component.
10 
Consider the state of Rio de Janeiro. It experiences a big surge in homicides in the 
first half of the 1990s, a (still unexplained) phenomenon that made the state infamous for 
its violence. Homicides decline afterwards, just to increase again in the late 1990s –early 
                                                 
10 We show only the most important states in terms of population. Figures for other states are available 
upon request.   13
2000s. After 2002 they start to decline consistently. If one is prepared to consider the 
early 1990s surge a sporadic event, homicides in Rio follow the same pattern as the 
aggregate for Brazil (figure 6). 
  All other states depicted in figure 7 show a familiar pattern. Homicides increase 
almost monotonically in the 1990s. In all cases, homicides stabilize in the early-to-mid 
1990s and then start to decline with different intensity. In summary, data from other 
states in the country show two things. First, homicides have strong co-movement across 
states, suggesting a common explanation. Second, the decline in the rest of Brazil starts 
later than in São Paulo. 
 























































Panel A: Rio de Janeiro














































































































Panel C: Rio Grande do Sul







































































































































































Source: DATASUS and Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE) 
 
 
4. Possible Culprits: Police, Guns, Incarceration, Arrests… 
 
  As a reaction to the surge in crime during the 1990s, São Paulo implemented 
major policy interventions, both at the municipal and the state level. In this section we 
consider these policy interventions as explanations for the large shift in homicides in the 
state of São Paulo.  
 
4.1 Police and Policing 
 
Anecdotal evidence in press stories suggests that the reduction in crime during the 
2000s is a consequence of years of well-conceived and well-executed crime-fighting 
policies. In this sub-section we assess the potential contribution of these policies. 
As expected, policy reacted to the rise in homicides during the 1990s. Table 1 lists 
the most relevant police-type policies adopted from the second half of the 1990s through 
2007.   17
 
Table 1 Policy Interventions      
Policy Level  Date 
Creation of INFOCRIM, a database system of 
crime geo-referencing  




Executive order linking number of police officer 
to INFOCRIM 
SPMA and large 
cities 2007 
Creation of DISQUE-DENÚNCIA, a anonymous 
crime hotline to denounce crime  State  2000 
Creation of FOTOCRIM, a database of pictures 
of wanted and in prison  State  1999 
Effective implementation of FOTOCRIM as an 
instrument of photograph identification State  2002 
Elaboration of the Plano de Combate aos 
Homicídios, with emphasis on capturing repeated 
murderers 
State  2001 
Creation of a Municipal Police Forces  SPMA
B  1962-2003
C 
"Operação Saturação", a centralized, systematic 
and permanent operation in drug-trafficking areas State  2006 
A: 1999 is the inauguration in the city of São Paulo. INFOCRIM starts to expand 
to other cities in SPMA in 2002. Other large cities in the state enter the system 
in 2005. See Biderman et al (2009). 
 
B: 26 out of the 39 cities that form the SPMA have Municipal Police Forces   
C: 7 Municipal Police Forces were created after 1998     
Source: Kanh and Zanetic (2005) and Biderman et al (2009)   
 
 
Most likely, all policy interventions had an impact on crime. The presence of a 
Compustat  system such as INFOCRIM helps law enforcement. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to imagine that interventions can account for the dynamics of homicide in the 
state of São Paulo. One reason is timing. All policy interventions occurred either exactly 
when the trend in homicides have been reversed (1999-2000), or afterwards. Although 
INFOCRIM was implemented in 1999, it became fully operational only in 2001, and data 
has not been used to determine local police force until recently.  
Figure 8 shows the number of police and arrests. Unfortunately we only had data 
starting in 2001 on both variables. Nevertheless, the numbers are still informative. In 
panel A has arrests. From 2001, arrests dropped from 260 to 220 per 100thd inhabitants, a 
15% decline. If an increase in severity or in the efficiency of police work explained the   18
decline in crime during the 2000s, one should see the opposite: arrests should be increase 
over the period. The fact that arrests decline in the period most likely reflects reverse 
causality: declining crime reduces arrests. 
Panel B has the number of policemen. The scale makes the series seemingly 
volatile. In fact, the number of policemen stayed constant over the period. Thus, a big 
quantitative increase in police cannot explain the large reduction in crime during the 
2000s. Of course, police quality may have improved but most interventions that improved 
police work occurred only later in the decade, and cannot explain the timing of the shift 




























































































Panel B: Number of Policemen
Source : Secretaria de Segurança Pública do Estado de São Paulo
per 100thd inhabitants
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  Figure 9 shows the prison population per 100,000 inhabitants in the state of São 


































































Source: Secretaria da Administração Penitenciária do Estado de São Paulo
São Paulo: 1994-2006
Fig. 9 Incarceration Rates
 
 
  The figure illustrates the difficulty in attributing the dynamics of homicide to 
incarceration. Incarceration rates rise monotonically, suggesting that, at least for the 
period of the 1990s, incarceration reacted to crime, and not contrary. Incarceration 
continues to increase in the 2000s even as crime decline, possibly reflecting an increased 
toughness in law enforcement. Nevertheless, it is hard to attribute causality. Among other 
things, incarcerated population increases at a reduced pace in the period 2004-2006, when 
compared with the 1994-2003 period, again suggesting reverse causality. 
 
 
4.3 Municipal Level Interventions 
   20
  Public security is mainly a state attribution in Brazil. Nevertheless, municipalities 
also reacted to the surge in crime during the 1990s, enacting laws and implementing 
crime-fighting policies. In this sub-section we describe the most important ones. 
  A most publicized local intervention was the adoption of mandatory night closing 
hours for bars and restaurants, popularly known as “Dry Laws”. In the SPMA, sixteen out 
of thirty-nine municipalities adopted such restriction on bars’ opening hours. Evidence 
suggests that dry laws did have causal impact on homicides.  Biderman et al (2009) find 
that dry law caused a 10% decline in homicides. Although this impact is practically 
relevant, “Dry Laws” cannot rationalize aggregate movements of crime in São Paulo. 
First, the first city to adopt was Barueri in March of 2001, i.e., almost two years after the 
peak of homicides. Second, the decline in homicides is much deeper than 10%. Finally, 
the breadth of the decline is much ampler than a few cities in the SPMA, as figure 1 
shows. 
  Another important local-level policy was the Disque-Denúncia, an anonymous 
hotline for reporting crimes and suspicious activity. Disque-Denúncia is a state-level 
policy that started in October 2000. Eight out of the thirty-nine municipalities passed 
laws mandating that the Disque-Denúncia number should be publicized the number in 
public places (schools, hospitals, buses, etc). See Kahn and Zanetic (2005). Evidence 
suggests that adherence to the Disque-Denúncia program did have an impact on crime 
(see Kahn and Zanetic (2005)). Again, this impact is not strong enough, wide enough and 
implementation was not early enough to explain the aggregate dynamics of crime in the 
state of São Paulo.
11 
  Other important municipal policies were the establishment of municipal police 
forces and municipal secretaries of public safety. Again, their timing and breadth are not 
compatible with being a first-order explanation.
12 In summary, municipal interventions 
contributed to the decline in crime rates but they cannot explain the general aggregate 
movement in crime in the state of São Paulo. 
 
                                                 
11 Kahn and Zanetic (2005) point out the big surge in calls in the Santos Metropolitan Region (the second 
largest in the state) in 2004, when Santos adhered to the system. Homicides in Santos had been declining 
for four years at that point. 
12 See Kahn and Zanetic (2005) on the timing of secretaries of public safety and municipal police forces.   21
4.3 Gun Control 
 
  In December 2003, the federal congress passed a federal law that substantially 
restricted the legal possession of firearms, and substantially increase the penalties for 
illegal possession (Lei do Desarmamento). While it is clear that this legislation cannot 
explain the timing of the shift in homicides, it does suggest that gun control did increase 
over the period. Anecdotal evidence suggests that starting in 1997 the state of São Paulo 
cracked down on the illegal possession of firearms, which leads local analysts to attribute 
the sharp swings in homicides to gun control (see The Economist 2005 and Goertzel and 
Kahn (2007)).  
Figure 10 has the data on rate of illegal firearm possession over the 1992-2005 































































Source: Secretaria de Segurança Pública do Estado de São Paulo
São Paulo: 1992-2005
Fig. 10 Illegal Firearm Possession Rates
 
 
The time-series pattern of illegal firearm possession seemingly matches the 
pattern of the homicide data. However, a few subtleties obscure causal interpretation. 
First is the issue of measurement. Reported illegal firearm possession is a combination of   22
the prevalence of firearms in the population (which one wants to observe) and police 
enforcement (which one wants to isolate). Consider the increase in illegal possession 
starting in 1997. This movement is in line with the anecdotal evidence that police cracked 
down on illegal gun possession (see Goertzel and Kahn (2007)). Thus, the hike in late 
1990s less is not due to an increase in firearm prevalence but to a tightening in 
enforcement. Along these lines, if one is prepared to assume away the problem of 
measurement and consider that the movement in illegal possession in the late 1990s was 
in fact an increase in prevalence, then one must also assume it was so in the early 1990s. 
But then it is hard to reconcile the movements in firearm prevalence and homicides. In 
summary, it seems that movement in guns prevalence played a role in the reduction of 
violence in the 2000s but it explains neither the increase in violence in the 1990 nor the 
reversal in the late 1990s.  
 
5. The Demographic Explanation 
 
This section shows evidence that the age structure is the main determinant of the 
aggregate movements in homicides in the state of São Paulo. First, we show that young 
males aged 15 to 24 are not only the main victims of homicides, but also the main 
perpetrators. Second, we show that the aggregate time-series patterns of population aged 
15 to 24 matches perfectly the time-series pattern of homicides: the age-group 15-to-24 
increases during the 1990s, reaches a peak in 2000 and the drops. Finally, we use a panel 
of cities to estimate the elasticity of homicides rates to changes in size of the 15-to-24 
year-old population. Elasticities are estimated controlling for city and year fixed-effects. 
Thus, results account for all time-invariant city heterogeneity and, more importantly, to 
all aggregate (common to all cities) shocks to homicides and age structure. The only 
variation left is how the age structure changed differently in different cities.  Thus no 
spurious pure time-series relationship arises. 
 
5.1 The Demographic Hypothesis 
   23
At the individual level, criminal involvement and age is one of the most robust 
relationships in all social sciences, dating back to at least Goring [1913]. A very non-
exhaustive list of more recent work would include Wilson and Herrnstein [1985], 
Blumstein [1995] and Cook and Laub [1998].  
Despite the individual level evidence, and the pronounced importance of the 15-
24 cohort in both perpetrating and being victims of homicides, recent literature is 
ambiguous as to the importance of changes in age structure to explain aggregate crime. 
Fox (2000) find that demography explains the major homicide trends from the mid 1960s 
through the mid 1980s, but account neither for the increase in violence in 1980s nor for 
the reduction during the 1990s.  Holding age-specific murder rates constant, Levitt (1999) 
finds that changes in age-structure explain less than 10% of the aggregate time-series 
variation over the 1960-1995 period. Zimiring (2007) examines in depth all the 
explanations for what he calls “the great American crime decline”. He shows that 
demographic trends were favorable in 1990s. Similarly to Levitt (1999), he also shows 
that, holding either ex-ante or ex-post age-specific homicide rates constant, changes in 
age structure cannot account for the magnitude of the shift in homicides.  However, in 
both cases, the interpretation of the decomposition hinges crucially on the assumption 
that age-specific homicide rates do not change with the size of the age group. With 
Brazilian data, I find that the size of the 14-25 age group affects homicide rate for ages 
15-24, which invalidate procedures such as Levitt’s (1999) (see section 8). For this 
reason I adopt the strategy of computing elasticities, and use them to predict homicides. 
Using hospital data, figure 10 shows the age distribution of homicide victims in 
the period 1991 through and 2006 in the state of São Paulo. Persons aged 15 to 24 
represent almost 40% of homicide victims. The second most victimized category is 25-34 
with roughly 30% of victims. If one uses data from the state-level secretary of security, 
the 15-24 represents a higher proportion of perpetrators of homicides, around 45% in 
2003. 
 
   24
 
In summary, the demographic hypothesis is theoretically plausible for the state of 




  Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics for SPMA and for all other cities with 
more 100thd inhabitant, for three periods: 1991-1995, 1996-2000, and 2001-2005. Two 
key variables are depicted: homicide rates and % of male population aged 15-24. 
 
 
Homicide Rate§ % Male 15-24 Homicide Rate§ % Male 15-24
1991-1995 41.79 9.37 15.83 9.36
1996-2000 54.66 9.58 25.54 9.58
2001-2005 45.95 9.18 23.87 9.37
‡: Cities with more than 100thd inhabitants in 2000
§: per 100thd inhabitants
Source: DATASUS and Instituto Brasiliero de Geografia e Economia (IBGE)
SPMA† OTHER LARGE CITIES‡
TABLE 2: Means for three different periods
†: Cities in the São Paulo Metropolitan Area
 
Source: DATASUS 
Fig. 10   25
 
Table 2 summarizes the story of the paper. Homicides rates and the percentage of 
males between 15 and 24 years old move together over time. Suggestively, in large cities 
outside the SPMA, where the demography varied less, crime also varied less. 
To assess how much the demography explains of the time-series pattern of crime 
we perform two Oxaca-Blinder-type decompositions. The DATASUS data has 
information on the victims’ age, which can be used as proxy for age group specific 
homicide rates.
13  
Let Hta be the homicide victim rate of age group a in year t. Victims are divided 
into nine groups, and t = 1991, 1992,…., 2004.
14 Let Pat  be the proportion of the 





ta ta t H P H  
Define 
 ta H as the homicide rate that would prevail in year t if age group specific 




ta a ta H P H    
 ta H is used a rough prediction of what would the homicide rate be in year τ if the 
demography changed but the level of homicides of year t were kept constant. Figures 11 
and 12 show predicted and actual homicides for the 1984-2004 and 1991-2004 periods, 
holding homicide victim rates of 1984 and 1991, respectively. 
 
                                                 
13 Levitt [1999] uses incarceration data, which is generated on the offender side, a better but unavailable 
measure. 
14 Groups are 0-4, 5-14, 15-24, 25-34,35-44,45-54,55-64,65-74 and over 75. 
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  Visual inspection of figures 11 and 12 show two facts. First, there is a remarkable 
co-movement between the two series. This is true for the whole 1984-2004 period, and 
for the sub-period 1991-2004. Thus, not only changes in the size of the 15-24 age-group 
predict homicides but also changes in the whole age structure of the population. Second, 
demographic changes do not pin down the level of homicides, but the decompositions are 
a qualitative exercise. As Levitt (1999) shows, quantitative interpretation is only 
warranted when the age-group specific crime rates are not a function of the population in 
the age-specific groups. Levitt (1999) finds evidence for US data that this assumption is 
satisfied. With São Paulo data this is not the case. Regressions, whose results we omit, 
show that age-specific homicides rates are functions of age-specific population. Thus, 
only the qualitative interpretation of timing of increase and decrease is warranted. As 
Zimiring (2007) shows, a non-trivial difference exists if we use ex-ante or ex-post age-
specific homicide rates. If ex-post rates were used, predicted homicides in 1999 would be 
30% higher than in 1991. This is still short of the 78% increase, but it is much closer. In   28
any event, when specific homicide rates are a function of population then qualitative 
movements are more informative than quantitative ones. 
 
5.2 Panel Evidence 
 
  Ultimately demography and crime are not randomly determined but are choices of 
the agents. Consequently, the relationship between demography and homicides may 
suffer from the usual problems: of reverse causality and omission of common 
determinants. Additionally, using time series variation alone one cannot dismiss the 
possibility that the relation arising in figures 11 and 12, and table 2 are a product of a 
sheer coincidence (although demography and homicides seem related above and beyond 
the inclusion of a high-order polynomial of time).   
  Reverse causation seems highly improbable, at least as a first order phenomenon 
empirically. It is true that homicide victims are concentrated in the male age bracket 15-
24. There are, however, too few murders to make a significant difference. For an 
illustration, at its 1999 peak, the city of São Paulo had 2418 homicides whose victims 
were 15-to-24-year-old males. Although the number is certainly very high, it amounts to 
no more than 0.25% of the 969,241 young males living in São Paulo that year. 
Furthermore, reverse causation, in this case, would bias the estimated relationship 
between demographics and crime towards zero 
Demography has two pillars. One is fertility and mortality, which largely 
produced by decision made several years - if no decades - before. Second is migration, a 
shorter-term decision. Similarly, crime is a decision made in the present. From the first 
channel (fertility), there is little chance that demography and crime have a common 
cause. Migration is more challenging for the estimation strategy, and it is further 
discussed below.    
  In this subsection we estimate how demography impacts violent crime using, 
along with variation over time, how demography evolved in different large cities in the 
state of São Paulo. Cross-city variation allows us to evaluate the “coincidence” 
explanation. Let i be a city and t be a year. The estimated model is: 
   29















1 0 1524 log log
  
 
                    (1) 
Homicides are rates per 100thd inhabitants, Male1524 is the percentage of 15-24 
year-old males. TIMEt  is a full set of year dummies, and CITYi  is a full set of city 
dummies. Controls, in some specifications, will include the log of population and the log 
of the high-school dropout rate. These two controls are quite important for our purposes. 
First, population will capture migration movements, the component of demography that 
is a product of current choices of agents. Second, it may be easier to maintain youngsters 
at school if there fewer of them.  
With a panel structure, one can discard all pure time-series variation (and all pure 
cross-city variation), leaving only how demography changed differently in different cities 
as a source of variation to estimate its impact on homicides. Several more layers of 
coincidence are now necessary to produce the results spuriously. Second, we can account 
for all time-invariant heterogeneity among cities, which helps identifying the effect of 
demography. The different panels in figure 13 illustrate graphically the type of variation 
explored when estimating equation (1). The proportion of 15-24 year-old males and 













                                                 
16 We depict no more than five cities for the sake of conciseness. Several other cities would confirm the 
pattern.   30
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  São Paulo, São José dos Campos and Itapecirica follow the typical pattern: 
proportion of 15-24 year-old males increased until 2000 and fell thereafter, with 
homicides following the same pattern. However, where the proportion of 15-24 year-old 
males increased less pronouncedly, and fell less pronouncedly (São Paulo), homicides 
also went up smoothly and fell relatively smoothly. In other cities, such as São José and 
Itapecirica, the proportion of 15-24 year-old males increased smoothly, but then drop 
steeply, homicides also increase smoothly and then dropped pronouncedly. Finally, 
consider Suzano and Embu. In the former, the proportion of 15-24 year-old males fell 
throughout the 1997-2005 period, and homicides followed the same pattern. On the other, 
in Embu the proportion of 15-24 year-old males increased sharply until 2000, and so did 
homicides; from 2000 onwards, the proportion of 15-24 year-old males fell very subtly, 
and so did homicides.  
Table 3 presents several models estimated using only data from the São Paulo 
Metropolitan Area (SPMA), in which case there is data starting in 1991.  
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Column (1) presents the simplest possible model, without city or year dummies 
and with no controls included. A 1% increase in the percentage of 15-24 year-old males 
is associated with 3.92% increase in homicides. To have a sense o practical importance, 
over the 1996-2000, there were 9.58% of young males in the SPMA, and 9.18% in the 
2001-2005 period (see table 2), which represents a 4.2% difference. Therefore, the 
coefficient implies that 16.37% of the reduction in homicides, which actually fell some 
16% over the period.
17 Since it is not clear whether current or (recent) past demography 
matters, homicides are regressed on the lag of Male1524 (column (2)). Results are even 
stronger. 
  Interestingly, when city-fixed effects are accounted for, the impact of demography 
is stronger, for both contemporaneous and the lag (4.95% and 5.48%). As expected, 
including year dummies dampens results, and so does including the two controls. 
However, we can always reject the null hypothesis of that demography does not cause 
homicides at reasonable significant levels. The lowest possible estimates arise when the 
two controls, population and high-school drop-out rates. Neither population nor drop-out 
rates seem to belong to the equation, but the percentage of 15-24 year-old males do. At 
                                                 
17 This is an extrapolation of a local interpretation of the log-in-log regression.   34
the lowest estimate, changes in the Male1524 imply a reduction of 7.14% in homicides 
from the second half of the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s. Finally, in column (9), 
the most complete model is estimated using a moving average of MALE1524. Results, as 
expected, are between those in columns (7) and (8). In table 4, again using data from the 
SPMA, several econometric robustness checks are performed. For the sake of 




Four pairs of regressions are presented, including and not including the controls. 
All regressions account for city and year fixed effects. The first is a pair of Weighted 
Least Square regressions, in which the variance is modeled as a decreasing function of 
population. There are cities of wildly different sizes in the SPMA, and homicides are a 
relatively rare occurrence, observations from small cities are very noisy. Results are in 
line with those in column (9) table III. While in columns (1) and (2) the variance is 
modeled, in columns (3) and (4) the autocorrelation in modeled as an AR(1) process. 
Results are stronger.    35
In dynamic models, if the first lag belongs to the equation, and errors are auto-
correlated (which columns (3) and (4) suggest is the case), the first lag is endogenous, 
and all coefficients are biased. To account for this possibility, we estimate the model by 
GMM using lags of the regressors as instruments (see Arellano and Bond [1991] for 
details). Even after including the first lag of homicide, results are once more stronger 
(columns (7) and (8)).
18  
Finally, the model is estimated with the sample restricted to 1997 onwards, for 
two reasons. First, by shortening the sample on the time dimension, one reduces the odds 
that time-varying unobserved heterogeneity across cities is driving results. Second, and 
more importantly, for 1997 onwards data are available for cities outside the SPMA. 
Results are significantly stronger than those with the whole 1991-2005 sample. In table 5, 
some of the models presented in tables 3 and 4 are replicated for a sample of all cities 
with more than 100,000 inhabitants.
19 
 
                                                 
18 The model is estimated in first-difference. After estimating the model by GMM, we tested for first and 
second order autocorrelation on the error term. This is important because if second order autocorrelation is 
still present, coefficients could be biased if the second lag of homicides belongs to the equation. While first 
order autocorrelation is indeed present, after including the first lag of homicides second order correlation is 
not present. 
19 We do not present all models for the sake of brevity. All other results are in line with those presented.   36
 
 
Three important messages arise from the table 5. First, when only the 1997-2005 
period is considered results are stronger than with the whole 1991-2005 period. The 
inclusion of large cities outside the SPMA does not change results in any significant 
way. We interpret these results as suggesting two facts. First, the phenomenon is wider 
than the SPMA. Second, with a shorter time length it is less likely that demography 
captures time-varying heterogeneity. Finally, confirm previous estimates, population 
seem to reduce homicides, and some models now suggest that more high-school drop-
out rates increase homicide as one should expect. The coefficient on population is 
puzzling in the light of the previous literature on social interaction that would predict 
crime rates are higher in larger cities (Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman [1996]). Our 
results suggest that, perhaps, economically dynamic and safer cities receive an influx of 
population. Since young males are more prone to moving, unobserved migration 
movements (imperfectly captured by population) would work towards biasing the 
impact of young males on homicides towards zero. 
   37
6. Conclusion and Discussion 
 
Using data from São Paulo, we recover very large impact of age structure on 
homicides. Using the average panel elasticities estimated in tables 3 through 5 (3.4), we 
predict aggregate homicides using only changes in the aggregate proportion of the 15-to-
24 year population. Demography predicts a 22% increase in homicides between 1991 and 
2000, and a return to the 1991 level in 2004. This matches well the actual movement in 
homicides.   
Aggregate movements in crime in São Paulo and Brazil resemble the case of New 
York and the rest of the US ten years earlier. A strong common component across cities 
drove trends crime in the US (see Zimiring (2007)). However, in New York, a harbinger, 
the movements were more pronounced, especially the decline. Analogously, São Paulo 
anticipated the rest of the country. Yet another similarity, the decline was particularly 
pronounced in São Paulo, suggesting that the policy reactions outlined in section 3 did 
have an impact. However, only demography explains the decline in 2000s, the timing of 
reversal and the surge in the 1990s. This, along with the common component character of 
the crime trends, shows that demography is the key element driving movements in 
homicide in São Paulo over the last two decades. 
Our results are seemingly in contraction to Naritomi and Soares (this volume), 
which find only a small role for demography in explaining why crime is high in Latin 
America. Two facts reconcile the results. First, Naritomi and Soares use age-crime 
elasticities available in the literature, which perhaps needs revisiting. Second, Naritomi 
and Soares measure quite a different object: the contribution of different determinants 
using mainly cross-country differences. We measure the impact of a large shift in one 
contributing factor over time. Nothing guarantees that the impacts are similar. For 
example, country A may have 1% more young males than B, but many other factors may 
contribute more to explain differences in crime rates. However, if one changes the 
amount of young males sharply in one country, the impact of age structure may be much 
stronger, conditional on other determinants being fairly constant. Thus, our results should 
not be judged by the yardstick of cross-section estimates (Naritomi and Soares’s object)   38
but by the yardstick of identification: is it credible that other things are fairly constant in 
our data? We claim that it is, especially when panel data is used.  
The results in this paper are important per se for criminology science. While there 
is undisputable evidence that offenders are mostly males between 15 and 24 years old), 
whether age structure has an aggregate impact is not clear. Levitt [1999], for example, 
finds a limited role for demography. Our result can reconcile these two seemingly 
opposing pieces of evidence. Although age structure must mechanically contribute to 
crime rates, whether it makes an aggregate difference will probably depend on law 
enforcement, the efficacy of the judicial system, institutional development, educational 
and labor opportunity for young males, etc. Perhaps, in the state of São Paulo, differently 
from the US, the environment was ripe for demography to “flourish” as a cause of 
homicides. 
The results are also important in terms of policy. While it is hard to influence 
demography in the short-run, sub-optimal policy over-reaction can be avoided if 
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